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Executive Summary 
As many central banks contemplate the normalization of monetary policy, their focus is turning 
to the promise of macroprudential policy as a tool to manage possible future systemic risk in 
financial markets. Janet Yellen and Mario Draghi, among others, are pinning much of their hopes 
for managing financial stability in the context of Basel III on macroprudentialism. Despite central 
banks’ clear intention that this policy will play a significant role in developed economies, few 
policymakers or financial players know what macroprudential policy is, much less how to assess 
its efficacy or necessity. 
Our report aims to clarify the concept of macroprudential policy for a broader audience, 
cultivating a better understanding of these tools and their implications for broader monetary 
policy going forward. The report also advocates the use of more refined indicators for financial 
cycles as benchmarks for policy discussions on macroprudential policy. 
Key points: 
 The fundamental objective of macroprudential policy is to prevent unnecessary constraints 
on the supply of credit.  
 How macroprudential policies influence financial and real variables depends on the tool 
used. A better understanding of these channels is necessary to tailor and calibrate the 
policies to countries’ specific needs.  
 Successful experiences with macroprudential policy have shown the need for linkage with 
fiscal and monetary policies as well. 
 While there is no “one policy fits all,” financial cycles across the world are quite integrated 
and largely driven by conditions in major advanced economies. Yet, so far, the economies 
that have had the most experience with macroprudential tools are emerging countries with 
relatively closed economies. 
 A strong institutional framework is essential to ensure that macroprudential policy can work 
effectively. If central banks are to build adequate support for macroprudential regulation, 
they will have to cogently explain the public and social purpose this policy serves.  
 There is also a political challenge in the relationship between finance ministries and central 
banks on macroprudential questions, given that many decisions will have fiscal as well as 
financial and monetary implications with institutional politics at play.   
 The apparent failure of regulation usually leads to new, and increasingly complex, measures, 
which generate further unintended consequences (see Basel I, II and III). So far, little thought 
has been given to how the financial system will react to these new measures or whether 
focusing mainly on the banking system will ensure system wide stability or generate more 
distortions. 
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 Timing is a key element in the success of these policies. We provide evidence that credit per 
GDP, a widely used indicator, might not be the best proxy for the financial cycle. As an 
alternative, we prefer focusing on the extent to which financial intermediaries (e.g. banks) 
rely on supplementary, “non-core” funding in order to better assess the possibility of 
“overheating.” This measure also allows for the decomposition of funding sources in order to 
determine which intermediaries or funding methods potentially pose the greatest threats to 
an economy’s financial stability. 
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I. Introduction 
Before the global financial crisis unfolded, imbalances and risks within the financial structure had 
accumulated to such a level that they jeopardized the entire system and—absent unprecedented 
and extraordinary interventions by central banks and governments— threatened to devastate 
the real economy. Prior to 2007, a financial event such as a speculative bubble in the housing 
market or the downfall of a systemically important “too big to fail” institution might have been 
viewed as an isolated event, with blame laid solely on participants or regulators in the particular 
industry. With hindsight it has become evident that these seemingly unrelated risks of price 
bubbles or susceptibility to financial contagion are in fact closely intertwined. These intimate 
linkages and risk exposures among financial system participants pose serious threats to economic 
growth. 
Ironically, the quiet buildup of financial “fault lines” leading up to the crisis was due in part to 
financial institutions’ and regulators’ growing overconfidence in their ability to micromanage 
risks on an individual, or firm, level, without regard for broader systemic impact. Financial 
institutions were confident they had eliminated most of their risks by hedging their known 
idiosyncratic (individual) risks with products like credit default swaps, and diversifying exposures 
based on historical return relationships (e.g. real estate performance is a mostly local 
phenomenon so a sustained nationwide downturn is mathematically near impossible). 
Regulators monitored individual financial institutions to attempt to ensure that no single body 
was taking outsize risks. Regulators and financial institutions alike failed to anticipate that the 
burgeoning use of securitized products like credit default swaps could create harder-to-assess 
risk exposures among institutions such as banks, and that small destabilizing forces could ripple 
into catastrophic market disturbances in a fragile system. 
It is clear then why the crisis has highlighted the need for macroprudential supervision that takes 
a wider view of the financial system, beyond (but in complement to) traditional microprudential 
regulation. Macroprudential supervision is concerned with the stability of entire industries and 
the health of the relationships within the financial sector that can significantly impact the 
economy. While macroprudentialism has no precise definition, its principal goal is to monitor 
systemic risk. Such risk is a negative externality created by financial institutions that do not fully 
bear the cost of their actions but affect other participants in the financial system. It can manifest 
in two dimensions: across institutions (contagion risk) or across the financial cycle (procyclical 
risk). These risk dimensions are closely linked and their problems often accumulate at the same 
time—to participate in and enhance gains during an upswing in the financial cycle, firms can 
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increase leverage and concentrate that leverage in opaque but intimately connected areas of the 
financial system.  
 
A new framework to fill the gap 
Just as microprudential policy is too narrow in scope to take on these broader challenges, 
monetary policy is too blunt an instrument to address systemic risk in the financial system. 
Macroprudential supervision is emerging as a critical tool to fill this gap, where it can help 
coordinate policies and supervision among existing microprudential and monetary tools. With 
such supervision still in its nascent stages, consensus must still be developed on the best way to 
monitor or measure systemic risk. In the event that such risks to the financial system are reliably 
detected, questions remain as to what sort of actions—if any—are most desirable under a 
macroprudential framework.  
Empirical evidence may serve as a guide to assessing the efficacy of various macroprudential 
policies. Naturally, one might look to Asian economies that have been leaders in implementing 
macroprudential supervision and countercyclical measures. Studies have found many of these 
wide-ranging policies successful in achieving their objectives, whether cooling housing markets 
(loan-to-value limits on mortgages) or dampening the extension of credit (levies on procyclical 
types of funding for banks).  
However, understanding how these policies can be effectively implemented in developed 
Western economies such as Europe or the United States is a major challenge. Many Asian 
countries that employed macroprudential measures were more closed economies, with the 
ability to simultaneously coordinate monetary and fiscal measures. In more open Western 
economies, autonomous action by monetary and fiscal decision-makers cloud the ability to 
assess whether similar policies could be orchestrated.  
Overall, the system-wide focus is clearly welcome in light of recent crises, yet many unknowns 
still exist as policymakers seek to move forward in adopting macroprudential tools. This report 
aims to clarify the current state of the discussion around macroprudential policies. More 
specifically, it highlights the strengths and limitations of these “trendy” tools, in order to identify 
those (if any) that can effectively enable policymakers to achieve their main objective (reduce 
the risk of crisis and lower any excessive procyclicality) while providing a better understanding of 
their cost. 
We will proceed as follows. Section 2 presents the fundamental rationales behind such policies 
as well as how the currently available toolkit should be used. Section 3 describes the Basel III 
framework on how to monitor systemic risk, while Section 4 proposes a complementary indicator 
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to monitor the financial cycle and draws several stylized facts regarding previous experience with 
macroprudentialism. Section 5 looks at the interaction between macroprudential policy and 
political economy, while Section 6 concludes with the lessons learned and issues remaining. 
II. Macroprudential tools: How do they work?  
a. Fundamental rationales 
Most policymakers (governments, central banks, and international institutions) agree on the 
need for macroprudential policy to reduce systemic risk, whether it is to correct for market failure 
or smooth financial cycles. Unfortunately, macroprudential principles are not the main 
motivation for this consensus in an environment where monetary and fiscal policies have very 
little room left to maneuver. The guidelines proposed by the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (BCBS) in Basel III provide a rather telling story: They are mostly based on existing 
microprudential and regulatory tools to which “Pigouvian” taxes and levies have been added to 
meet their new macroprudential objectives. 1,2  
Understanding the fundamental rationales behind macroprudential policy is essential to 
appreciate how it complements monetary, fiscal and structural policies. Indeed, financial 
regulatory policies are not enough to address systemic risk, and other policies—especially 
monetary and fiscal policy—also have roles to play. Coordination among monetary, fiscal and 
macro- and microprudential policies is essential, nationally as well as internationally. 
The underlying causes of contagion or procyclicality risks dictate the type of policy required. 
Aggregate shocks such as commodity price shocks and policy deficiencies such as poorly 
conducted microprudential and monetary policies can generate both types of risk. Yet 
macroprudential policy would not be the appropriate answer in either case. 
Externalities and market failures arising from various financial frictions and market imperfections 
should motivate macroprudential polices, especially when microprudential supervision and 
monetary policy are conducted effectively. The 2007-08 crisis illustrates that spillovers across 
financial institutions and between the financial sector and the real economy are the key market 
failures that create systemic risk. Since then, these externalities have been commonly classified 
following two dimensions: 
                                                          
1 Microprudential tools are caps on loan-to-value ratios, limits on credit growth, additional capital adequacy 
requirements, reserve requirements and other balance sheet restrictions 
2 A Pigouvian tax is applied to a market activity that is generating negative externalities (costs for somebody else). 
The tax is intended to correct an inefficient market outcome by imposing costs equal to the negative externalities. 
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 Contagion risk: excessive concentration of risk among a few highly interconnected 
groups, as with too-big-to-fail institutions, which can take down the wider financial 
system when destabilized. 
 Procyclical risk: the underlying buildup of risks over time that are hidden and 
underpriced. In this case, the financial sector generates systemic risk endogenously.  
Hence, the macroprudential toolbox should focus on these two dimensions. However, financial 
regulatory policies are not enough to address systemic risk.  
b. Macroprudential toolkit  
Theoretically, the toolkit available is quite large as it includes existing microprudential and other 
regulatory tools, taxes and levies, as well as new instruments. In practice, however, the IMF has 
identified 18 main instruments, and in 2013 it launched a survey on Global Macroprudential 
Policy Instruments (GMPI) in which central banks or national authorities disclosed which they 
were using. As a complement, Zhang and Zoli (2014) propose an index that records the frequency 
of their use. 3,4 Both indices focus on the 2000-2013 period for 43 countries—24 of which are 
emerging and 19 advanced.5 Table 2 classifies these measures around three main axes: housing, 
contagion, and reserve requirements. If we refer to the previous classification of externalities, 
we see that many could address both the contagion and the procyclical risks. As a result, since 
each tool has unique advantages and limitations, a combination is likely to provide a better 
solution to the problem of correcting the same externality. 
 
Diversity in the type of instruments in use, Tables 3a and b 
Overall, the use of macroprudential tools has become more frequent and varied over the years, 
across all the countries considered. In 2013, closed or emerging economies have used 
instruments related to contagion and housing in roughly equal amounts, while using many of the 
reserve requirement instruments as well, which they consider monetary tools. In contrast, open 
or advanced economies favor measures related to housing but also use some of the contagion-
risk instruments. Among the instruments available, both emerging and advanced countries prefer 
loan-to-value-related measures and debt-to-income-ratio. In addition, emerging countries use 
                                                          
3 Table 1 lists the countries considered. 
4 This index, proposed by Zhang and Zoli (2014), records the major prudential measures from a wide range of sources 
(studies, central banks or national supervisors’ websites…). They use a binary variable, taking on value 1 for 
tightening actions and -1 for loosening ones. It only accounts for changes in policy stance since 2000, ignoring the 
impact of pre-2000 actions. See Cerutti et al. (2015) and Zhang and Zoli (2014) for details on these indices. 
5 We rebuilt the indicators so they consider the same groups of countries. 
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concentration limits and reserve requirement measures quite frequently, which is consistent 
with their concerns about large, volatile capital flows and related systemic risks.  
By 2013, the overall number of instruments used had doubled since before the crisis, while the 
emerging nations’ share remained stable at about two-thirds. Clearly, these countries have more 
flexibility in implementing these tools. 
 
Frequency of the measures in use, Figures 1a, b and c 
Changing the focus from the type of instruments to the frequency of their use, Figures 1a, b and 
c report the number of macroprudential measures implemented by the different groups of 
countries. 
Since 2006, the macroprudential policy stance has significantly tightened. Yet most of the regions 
experienced a loosening at the height of the global financial crisis in 2009, followed by a 
tightening when capital flows resumed in 2010, following exceptionally accommodative 
monetary policy in advanced economies. These temporary changes in behavior support the idea 
that macroprudential policy has been used as a countercyclical tool. Overall, Asia has used 
macroprudential measures the most frequently, accounting for 58 percent of the usage in 2013, 
of which 38 percent is in emerging Asia. 
A closer look at the average number of measures per country reveals clear differences across 
regions but also within Asia. While both advanced and emerging Asian countries are the most 
active users of macroprudential tools, very few countries are driving this trend, namely China, 
India, and South Korea. (Figures 1b and c)  
China and India have been heavy users of domestic prudential policy tools, especially reserve 
requirements and housing measures, accumulating 40 and 14 measures in 2013, respectively. 
Coincidentally, a country’s macroprudential policy stance seems to be strongly related to the 
housing prices in the country. As an example, ASEAN countries that have experienced more stable 
housing prices in recent years have had a lower rate of implementation of macroprudential policy 
compared to the rest of Asia.6  
Finally, it is worth noting that the tools considered to date are mostly based on existing 
microprudential tools that are adaptable to macroprudential objectives. These tools are part of 
the road map proposed in Basel III to mitigate systemic risk.  
                                                          
6 In our sample, ASEAN countries are Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore that report in 2013 a -1, 5 and 10 
macroprudential measures, respectively. 
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III. Systemic risk  
a. Basel III framework 
The regulations suggested in Basel III  address the systemic risk issue by (i) significantly increasing 
capital buffers for risks related to the interconnectedness of the major dealers and (ii) 
incentivizing institutions to reduce counterparty risk through clearing and active management 
(hedging).  
While the first point aims at reducing the contagion risk generated by global systemically 
important financial institutions (G‑SIFIs), current initiatives focus mostly on banks. Every year, 
the Financial Stability Board and similar institutions in other countries publish a list of global and 
domestic/national systemically important banks (G‑SIBs and D/N-SIBs) based on a methodology 
that refers to size, interconnectedness, cross-border activity, the lack of available substitutes, 
and complexity. Then, each country applies its regulatory measures (Dodd-Frank for the United 
States) such as higher loss absorbency, more intensive scrutiny, and resolution planning 
requirements.  
The second point aims at reducing procyclical risk. Basel III introduces a framework for a time-
varying capital buffer on top of the minimum capital requirement. The countercyclical capital 
buffers are intended to make banks more resilient against imbalances in credit markets and 
thereby enhance medium-term prospects for the economy. In good times when system-wide 
risks are growing, the regulators could impose counter-capital buffers, which would help the 
banks withstand losses in bad times. Basell III suggests credit per GDP as the proxy for the 
financial cycle. 
Basel III represents a significant cooperation and coordination effort across G-20 countries. Yet 
its guidelines or, more precisely, their implementation at the country level raises many questions. 
At this stage of the Basel III process, two main drawbacks should be highlighted. First, will 
stabilizing the banking sector be enough to stabilize the whole financial system? Indeed, the 
current thrust of regulation could create powerful incentives to move financing from the banking 
system to unregulated financial institutions and securitization. Second, will policymakers be able 
to reliably identify the buildup of financial risks in order to effectively lean against the cycle? Even 
when excesses are evident, assessing their impact on the real economy and weighing them 
against the effects of tighter macroprudential policy are quite challenging. The difficulties range 
from the risk of diagnostic error (both Type I and II) to how to account for country circumstances 
and characteristics (financial structure, industrial organization and ownership structure, 
openness, exchange rate regime, international financial integration, political economy, etc.). 
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b. Monitoring 
Timing is a key element in the macroprudential framework defined in Basel III, whether it is 
assessing the risk of contagion and defining an appropriate response or adjusting countercyclical 
buffers. In this section, we suggest the use of complementary indicators to more accurately 
monitor the state of the financial system. Furthermore, we provide evidence that a widely used 
indicator, credit per GDP, might not be the best proxy for the financial cycle. As an alternative, 
we prefer focusing on the degree of financial intermediaries’ reliance on supplementary “non-
core” funding in order to better assess the possibility of “overheating.” This measure also allows 
the decomposition of funding sources in order to determine which intermediaries or funding 
methods potentially pose the greatest threats to an economy’s financial stability. 
 
Contagion and systemic risk: SRISK indicator 
In the absence of consensus regarding the most effective methodology for assessing the 
resilience of financial systems, the Basel III framework advocates country-specific stress tests. As 
a result, central banks such as the Bank of England, the European Central Bank and the Federal 
Reserve evaluate their system’s capital adequacy, on a yearly basis, relying on 
supervisory/confidential data. The outcome of these tests may lead to policy responses if the 
level of capitalization is deemed unsatisfactory based on Basel III guidelines (or more accurately, 
with the country’s regulations derived from Basel III, such as Dodd-Frank for the U.S.). Yet, these 
tests are country- or currency-area-specific and thus difficult to compare. 
As an alternative, Acharya et al. (2010a, b, 2012) and Brownlees and Engle (2011) propose a 
measure of systemic risk (SRISK) that relies solely on publicly available market data. Similar to the 
stress tests, the SRISK measure represents the capital a financial institution would need to raise 
during severe marketwide downturns to function normally. The data are updated every two 
weeks and available at the New York University Volatility Laboratory website.  
While the indicators are complementary, for this report we prefer the SRISK measure because (i) 
it is available for several countries, (ii) it accounts for the endogeneous nature of the systemic 
risk, which makes it macroprudential based, (iii) its assessment does not depend on Basel risk 
regulation (capital ratio measurement), and (iv) it has a higher frequency—bimonthly instead of 
yearly. 
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Financial cycle and systemic risk: credit per GDP versus liability ratios 
Basel III guidelines are more specific when it comes to the financial cycle. They recommend a 
formula that translates the credit gap measure into activation of the countercyclical capital buffer 
(CCB). The CCB should be imposed if the credit-to-GDP ratio exceeds its trend value. More 
specifically, threshold values of the gap are used to define when the buffer should be deployed. 
If the gap is below 2 percent, the CCB is zero. If the gap is above 10 percent, the CCB should be 
set at its maximum of 2.5 percent of risk-weighted assets.7
 
Between the lower and upper 
threshold, the CCB should vary with the extent of the buildup of systemic risk.  
While an aggregate indicator for credit is useful, knowing the source and quality of the credit is 
essential when assessing whether a policy response is needed and how it should be calibrated. 
Monitoring systemic risk within the financial cycle requires correct evaluation of both the stage 
of the credit cycle relative to its long-term behavior and the propagation of financial risks or 
systemic risk spillovers. The credit-to-GDP ratio captures only the first. 
Following Shin and Shin (2011), we build an alternative indicator using the composition of bank 
funding.8 The idea is that funding markets are the balance-sheet counterpart to intermediate 
lending, and they can be sorted around two categories:  
- Core liabilities, namely retail deposits of domestic household and business, which are stable 
and grow in line with the economy.9 
- Non-core liabilities, encompassing the other major forms of funding such as lending between 
banks or foreign lending, are more volatile. Non-core liabilities include funding sources for 
banks—and, in more mature financial markets, other financial intermediaries. 
In times of “excessive” credit growth, non-core liabilities increase in order to fund the fast-
growing lending that cannot be accommodated by core liabilities. Both liabilities should provide 
useful signals on financial conditions. Hence we calculate two indicators: 
- Non-core liabilities to GDP ratio: Normalizing by the level of economic activity allows a better 
understanding of the size of the financial market and its non-core fraction relative to the size 
of the real economy. While directly comparable to the credit-to-GDP ratio, it also shares its 
main drawback: GDP is a poor “real-time” measure because it is often revised.   
- Non-core to total liabilities ratio: increasing proportions of non-core funding relative to core 
deposits could indicate a credit market that is “overheating.” Focusing on the composition of 
                                                          
7 Drehmann et al. (2013) suggest calculating the long-term trend using the Hodrick–Prescott filter with a lambda of 
400,000. 
8 Shin and Shin (2010) consider one country: South Korea. 
9 Our definitions are in line with IMF’s core and non-core liquidity definition (2015). The data are collected from 
national and international institutions’ websites such as IMF, central banks, and regulatory agencies. 
11 | P a g e  
 
the financial system enables the buildup of one funding method or intermediary to be 
monitored (see Box 1 for more detail). 
These indicators are complementary in the effort to understand the vulnerability of a country’s 
financial market based on its reliance on short-term funding or short-term foreign currency debt 
as well as type of lender. Both sets of information are essential when designing well-targeted 
policy. 
c. Stylized facts  
Figure 2 plots all the measures discussed, that is both to-GDP ratios and their long-term trend, 
SRISK and the macroprudential index measuring frequency of use. For this illustration, we focus 
on the most active countries in terms of macroprudential policy (see Fig. 1.c): China, South Korea 
and Thailand.10 
The three countries tend to increase the number of macroprudential tools in use when the 
financial cycle indicators deviate from the long-term trend. These also coincide, at least for China 
and South Korea, with higher levels of systemic risk. Furthermore, a comparison of the to-GDP 
ratios shows that very little of the credit in the economy relies on non-core liabilities for the three 
countries. South Korea, which has the most reliable data among the three and has been cast as 
a successful illustration of macroprudential policy, reports an average total credit-to-GDP of 185 
percent for 2014 with 40 percent depending on non-core liabilities. 
Focusing on the timing of the indicator, Figure 3 reports indicators’ deviation from their long-
term trend and the 2 percent threshold level, beyond which countercyclical buffers should be 
deployed. In each of the three cases, the GDP ratios identifying a significant deviation in trend at 
different dates, with the non-core liabilities-based indicator signaling at least three months 
earlier. 
Figure 3 also reports deviations from the long-term trend for the non-core to total liabilities ratio. 
The level of this ratio confirms that the financial systems of these economies are relatively simple, 
relying mostly on standard banking activities (close to 80 percent).11 Yet, both countries observe 
a change in composition, with growth in the fraction of non-core liabilities, relative to total 
liabilities, faster than the long-term trend around the same time as the other liabilities ratio. 
Performing the same analysis for all the countries confirms the usefulness of the non-core 
liabilities ratios for both advanced and emerging economies. Table 4 summarizes some of the key 
                                                          
10 Even though we report Chinese data as an illustration, the Chinese financial system is unique and the categories 
used here may not capture most of it. 
11 Based on the data, China’s ratio is around 2 percent but China’s financial system is a special case. 
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features that can be observed when focusing on the 2006-2011 period. Overall, both to-GDP 
ratios have identified 27 instances where deviations from the long-term trend surpass the 2 
percent level. Of those, 67 percent of the time the liabilities-based indicator signals a strong 
deviation from the long-term trend three months in advance on average.  
The lag extends to five months if the euro zone countries are removed from the sample. Euro 
zone countries started reporting “Other Financial Corporations” information in 2008, so the 
limited amount of data makes estimating a long-term trend for the period studied difficult. 
Furthermore, the deviation based on the liabilities tends to be stronger, with a magnitude 
differential varying from 12 to 17 percentage points on average. It also lasts longer, from one to 
seven months on average, depending on the group of countries considered. These differences 
may well be essential when it comes to designing an adequately calibrated policy response. 
 
Common factors and challenges  
Looking coincidentally at the macroprudential index and the non-core liabilities-based ratios (per 
GDP and per total liabilities), Figures 4.a,b and c highlight common factors across countries with 
the strongest macroprudential stances.  
With the exception of Singapore and Hong Kong, which are special cases as leading international 
financial centers, the financial markets of the countries recording at least four macroprudential 
measures depend overwhelmingly on banks’ core funding, as both liabilities-based ratios are 
below 50 percent. In other words, these countries have limited depth in their financial systems 
relative to their real economies and have relatively “simple” financial structures, with banks more 
important than capital markets. Whether they are closed emerging economies (China, Malaysia, 
Poland, Romania, Russia, Thailand, and Turkey), closed advanced economies (Korea, Singapore) 
or open advanced economies (Hong Kong, the Netherlands, Slovakia), their access to 
autonomous monetary policy is restricted. Whether this is due to proactive exchange rate 
management, greater carry-trade inflows or being part of a monetary union, the outcome is the 
same: Macroprudential policy seems to be an alternative to monetary policy for reining in 
domestic liquidity. Finally, most of these countries have more concentrated institutional systems 
(industrial organization, ownership structure, central bank and government), which makes the 
implementation of these tools easier. 
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IV. What about the U.S., the UK, and the euro zone? 
Unlike the countries previously discussed, the euro zone, the UK, and the U.S. are relatively large, 
open economies with well-developed and complex institutions. For instance, in the U.S., less than 
half of total liabilities outstanding can be linked to bank balance sheets, while more than half can 
be attributed to the so-called shadow banking system. In Europe, banks are still responsible for 
the majority of financial intermediation. In France, they count for close to 60 percent of total 
liabilities, although the share of non-bank financial intermediation has increased. Furthermore, 
the recent crisis showed these countries tend to influence the global financial cycle. Monitoring 
systemic risk is essential for them as they actively contribute to it, yet the complexity of these 
advanced Western economies makes the task extremely challenging. 
Beyond their macroeconomic conditions, their network of international banks need to be taken 
into account because they may exacerbate policy’s unintended consequences. A very open 
capital account and large foreign bank presence make circumvention of the rules more likely. 
Aiyar, Calomiris, and Wieladek (2014) show that foreign bank branches increased their lending in 
the UK in response to tighter measures applied to local banks, a sign of cross-border competition 
and regulatory arbitrage. Similarly, as supervisors required UK-based banks and their subsidiaries 
to meet higher capital requirements during the 2000s, local banks lent less abroad. 
In the presence of independent monetary policy, its interaction with macroprudential policy 
cannot be ignored and should be managed. So far, only the Bank of England hosts both the 
Monetary Policy Committee and the Financial Policy Committee, which is responsible for 
macroprudential measures. The U.S. Federal Reserve has some macroprudential tools, but others 
are dispersed among several agencies. The ECB’s main difficulty is the key difference between 
macroprudential and monetary policies: Macroprudential policy must be country-specific and is 
sensitive to a country’s political pressure while it must be coherent for the euro zone as a unit. 
Unfortunately, the political economy constraints on macroprudential policy may be more difficult 
than those for monetary policy. Indeed, the actual benefits of such policy remain rather abstract 
to many, while its distributional effects can be easily predicted and tend to be politically sensitive: 
Constraining households’ access to loans in housing markets or the rise in the price of financial 
intermediation (spreads) arising from some measures are obvious examples.  
V. Interaction with the political economy  
As noted earlier, the IMF, consistent with statements by the Financial Stability Board and the 
Bank for International Settlements (BIS), describes macroprudential policy as “the use of 
primarily prudential tools to limit systemic risk. A central element in this definition is the notion 
of systemic risk—the risk of disruptions to the provision of financial services that is caused by an 
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impairment of all or parts of the financial system, and can cause serious negative consequences 
for the real economy.” Although the concept of macroprudential policy seems simple, the need 
to intervene in an economy and its financial system, using a variety of tools to ward off systemic 
risk, is more complicated. It is unlike monetary policy, which generally involves a straightforward 
arrangement whereby one instrument targets one objective. 
 Adhering to the general view that there are two types of macrofinancial risks, macroprudential 
instruments can take either a time series (procyclical) or cross-sectional (contagion) approach. 
Both dimensions can influence the political economy of macroprudential policy. From the time 
series perspective, efforts to mitigate systemic risk through policy interventions in financial and 
credit markets, designed to affect price formation and/or direct credit and investment flows 
away from certain areas and into others, clearly have a distributional impact. This can instigate a 
political response as affected constituencies seek redress. Cross-sectional actions are more 
geared to limiting tail risk and therefore once in place they are more likely to spur interaction 
with regulators and other officials than with politicians.  Therefore, it appears that 
macroprudential policy is inherently more political than monetary policy, which is generally 
viewed—at least in more advanced economies—as the domain of central banks and their 
technocrats. 
There is also an important, yet often underappreciated, ideological/philosophical component of 
macroprudential policy. By its very nature, there is a presumption that financial markets are 
inefficient, operate on less-than-perfect information, and are subject to regulatory arbitrage and 
herding. Although it would be premature to declare a paradigm shift, it is not a stretch to claim 
that underlying assumptions concerning the efficient-market hypothesis, and how they relate to 
wider macroeconomic performance, have been challenged and revised by the declared need for 
macroprudential policy by the regulatory community (Baker, 2013b). In this sense, regulators’ 
cognitive filters have been reprogrammed by the reliance being placed on this policy as financial 
instability is increasingly viewed as a cyclical, endogenous, and endemic characteristic of modern 
financial markets (Baker, 2013a).  
 
Institutional framework of macroprudential policy 
Because macroprudential policy is at an early stage of implementation, it faces a number of 
crucial issues. One of the most important is building—or refining—its institutional underpinnings. 
A strong institutional framework is essential to ensure that the policy can work effectively. As 
noted by the IMF and others, the framework must foster the ability to act in the face of evolving 
systemic threats, assuring access to information and defining an appropriate range and reach of 
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macroprudential instruments. It needs to establish strong accountability and compel assertive 
and timely action, despite lobbying by the financial industry or political pressure.  
For many countries, the central bank has been the focal point for macroprudential policy. In 
instances where powers have been delegated to central banks, they also can be revoked by 
politicians, especially where macroprudential mandates remain vague and allow considerable 
discretion. Paradoxically, high levels of central bank discretion and empowerment are likely to 
increase the political questioning and scrutiny they can expect.  
If central banks are to build support for macroprudential regulation, they will have to cogently 
explain the public and social purpose this policy serves. Simply speaking about the importance of 
financial stability is unlikely to be successful, reflecting the public’s inclination toward financial 
stability myopia and time inconsistent preferences. In the end, the failure to build broader 
rationales and constituencies will damage their capacity to fulfill their new regulatory role. 
However, cultivating constituencies and a broader sense of purpose for this project potentially 
erodes central banks’ claims to technically impartial and nonpolitical authority.  
Although central banks are playing a key role in the exercise of macroprudential policy, they are 
not the only institutions involved. Participation by government departments and regulatory 
agencies can help bring about the effective use of macroprudential tools. In addition, 
governments can be useful in ensuring the support of tax policy and facilitating legislative 
changes to mitigate systemic risk by creating regulatory authority over nonbank lenders and 
other institutions. 
Because the relationship between central banks and government institutions is at an early stage 
when it comes to managing macroprudential policy, challenges are still being identified. For now, 
it is safe to say that if institutional silos and rivalries develop, it could hinder risk identification 
and mitigation, undermining the effectiveness of the policy. The overlap among policy areas is 
another major challenge. There is also a political challenge in the relationship between finance 
ministries and central banks on macroprudential questions, given that many decisions will have 
fiscal as well as financial and monetary implications with institutional politics at play.   
 
The political landscape 
Macroprudential policy by most standards is a new field and it is hard to say how it will play out 
politically. Among the unknowns is the degree of involvement from politicians and industry 
players as well as the attitudes of the wider public toward the tactics and tools used to conduct 
policy. Assessing how the institutional design of macroprudential frameworks will interact with 
the wider political process requires some degree of speculation.  
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At this point, the intervention of politicians generally has been limited. Legislation identifying 
broad aspects of the policy and its operation has been agreed. However, much of the detail has 
been left to government and central bank officials to figure out. In the United States, the system 
for implementing macroprudential tools and measures is composed of many independent 
regulators, each of whom has mandates focused on particular institutions or markets. The 
legislation governing each agency limits its objectives and the reach of its regulations. No agency 
has the explicit objective of maintaining financial stability—for taking into account the 
macroprudential add-ons to microprudential oversight.  
The Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC), created as part of the Dodd-Frank legislation, 
has made progress in promoting cooperation among many agencies in the context of shared 
goals but isn’t as effective as it needs to be in the balkanized U.S. regulatory system. The fact that 
the FSOC has to make recommendations on a comply-or-explain basis indicates difficulties and 
shortcomings in the political process. At minimum, the FSOC structure needs to be changed to 
enhance its independence and its ability to take unpopular stands, especially on countercyclical 
macroprudential policy.  
At its core, the emerging political economy of macroprudential regulation suffers from a political 
constituency problem. As Claudio Borio of the Bank for International Settlements recounts, there 
is no readymade constituency against the inebriating feeling of growing rich that is characteristic 
of a financial boom (Borio, 2013). Unlike monetary policy, whose prowess in fighting inflation can 
be linked to an individual’s own welfare, a macroprudential perspective alludes to systemically 
beneficial outcomes only tenuously associated with individual gains. In this type of circumstance, 
it is understandable that politicians might not want to be associated with a policy that could be 
viewed as “taking away the punch bowl.”    
 
VI. Concluding remarks 
The macroprudential framework and the regulations implemented in various countries are still a 
work in progress. So far, most regulations focus on banks, whether the banking system represents 
20 percent or 100 percent of a nation’s financial sector.  
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The success of these regulations in promoting financial stability remains unclear and their 
potential unexpected consequences quite unsettling, as financial activities tend to migrate to less 
regulated markets with the resulting risks often underestimated.12 
At the recent “Rethinking Macro Policy III” conference in Washington, D.C., IMF Chief Economist 
Olivier Blanchard said: “Policymakers cannot be simple observers, as what the financial system 
will be depends very much on regulation. And we do not have a good sense of what regulation 
should be.” Such a warning should encourage policymakers to acquire a better understanding of 
the issues before trying to regulate them. Already, we have learned from Basel I, II and III that 
failing to heed the financial sector’s reaction to proposed changes in policy and regulation leads 
to more complex and less efficient measures. What about changing strategy and trying a 
“transparent and constructive” dialogue as a starting point?  
  
                                                          
12 Goodhart’s law (1975): “Any observed statistical regularity will tend to collapse once pressure is placed upon it 
for control purposes.”  
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Tables 
Table 1: Country group classifications 
  MaPP a advanced b open c   MaPP advanced open 
Argentina* y       
Australia* y y y Kuwait y   
Austria y y y Latvia y y y 
Bangladesh    Lebanon y  y 
Belgium  y y Lithuania    
Bolivia    Malaysia y   
Brazil* y   Mexico* y   
Bulgaria y  y Morocco    
Canada* y y y Netherlands y y y 
Chile y  y New Zealand y y y 
China* y   Nicaragua    
Colombia y   Nigeria y   
Costa Rica    Norway y y y 
Croatia y   Pakistan    
Czech 
Republic  y  Panama    
Denmark  y y Peru y   
Egypt    Philippines y   
Estonia y y y Poland y   
Euro Area*  y y Portugal  y y 
Finland y y y Romania y   
France*  y y Russia* y   
Germany*  y y Saudi Arabia* y  y 
Greece  y y Serbia y   
Guatemala    Singapore y y  
Hong Kong y y y Slovakia y y y 
Hungary y  y Slovenia  y y 
Iceland  y y Spain y y y 
India* y   Sweden y y y 
Indonesia* y   Switzerland y y y 
Ireland y y y Thailand y   
Israel y y y Turkey* y   
Italy*  y y 
United 
Kingdom* y y y 
Japan*  y y United States* y y y 
S. Korea* y y  Uruguay y     
*Stands for G-20 membership, a MaPP index from Zang and Zoli (2014),b Income-based classification from IMF 
WEO (April 2014), and  c DeFacto Financial Openness from Cerutti et al. (2015).  
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Table 2: Macroprudential toolbox for MaPP13 
 
 
 Housing-related measures, such as loan-to-value ratio and ratio caps,** debt-to-income 
ratio, dynamic loan-loss provisioning, and general countercyclical capital 
buffer/requirement, loan-to-deposit ratio* 
 
 Contagion measures, such as leverage ratio, capital surcharge on SIFIs, limits on 
interbank exposures, concentration limits, limits on domestic currency loans, and 
levy/tax on financial institutions, sector specific buffer/requirement,* margins/haircuts 
on collateralized financial market transactions* 
 
 Reserve requirements:14 reserve requirement ratios, limits on foreign currency loans, FX 
and/or countercyclical reserve requirements,** limits on open FX positions or currency 
mismatches* 
 
 
 
                                                          
13 Authors’ classification based on Zhang and Zoli (2014) and Cerruti et al. (2015). 
14 While reserve requirements can be categorized as macroprudential policy tools, they are often used as monetary 
policy instruments in emerging economies. 
*New tool with not enough data to be included in the analysis. ** Instruments derived by Cerruti et al. (2015) from 
the Global Macroprudential Policy Instruments (GMPI) survey from the IMF. 
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             Table 3.a.: Diversity in the type of instruments used 
    Contagion  Housing-related  Reserve   Total   
nb of  
countries 
Types of 
countries 
2000 2006 2013   2000 2006 2013   2000 2006 2013   2000 2006 2013 
                
22 Open 17 18 32   12 16 42   3 5 5   32 39 79 
21 Closed 19 27 36   8 22 37   9 14 22   36 63 95 
                                  
19 Advanced 9 11 23   11 14 33   2 2 4   22 27 60 
24 Emerging 27 34 45   9 24 46   10 17 23   46 75 114 
                                  
5 Adv. Asia 2 3 6   5 8 11   1 1 2   8 12 19 
6 Eme. Asia 4 6 10   2 8 12   1 1 3   7 15 25 
14 Europe/US 8 9 19   6 6 23   1 1 2   15 16 44 
6 Latin Am. 13 15 16   7 7 11   6 9 9   26 31 36 
3 Middle East. 4 4 5   0 2 4   2 2 2   6 8 11 
9 CEE/CIS* 5 8 12   0 7 18   1 5 9   6 20 39 
             Sources: Cerutti et al. (2015) and authors’ calculations.* 
Central and Eastern Europe/Community of Independent States 
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Table 3.b: Diversity in the type of instruments used 
Measures in 2013 Advanced economies   Emerging economies 
  Total Pct.   Total Pct. 
Housing-related           
Loan-to-value related measures 24 40%   30 26% 
Debt-to-income ratio 6 10%   11 10% 
Dynamic loan-loss provisioning 1 2%   5 4% 
General countercyclical capital buffer 2 3%   0 0% 
            
Contagion           
Leverage ratio 4 7%   3 3% 
Capital surcharges on SIFIs 2 3%   3 3% 
Limits on interbank exposures 4 7%   11 10% 
Concentration limits 7 12%   19 17% 
Limits on domestic currency loan 0 0%   4 4% 
Levy/tax on financial institutions 6 10%   5 4% 
            
Reserve requirements            
Limits on foreign currency loans 2 3%   7 6% 
Reserve requirements-related 
measures 2 3%   16 14% 
Sources: Cerutti et al. (2015) and authors’ calculations. 
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Table 4: Credit/financial cycle indicator 
 
  
      
Signaling Full sample   Without euro countries 
 credit to GPD 
non-core to 
GDP  
credit to 
GPD 
non-core to 
GDP 
Timing  difference           
 
faster 30% of 
the time 
faster 67% of 
the time  
faster 15% 
of the time 
faster 85% of 
the time 
      
Average  
3 months 
earlier   
5 months 
earlier 
      
Median  
4 months 
earlier   
6 months 
earlier 
      
Magnitude           
average maximum 9% 26%  8% 20% 
median maximum 8% 13%  8% 9% 
      
Duration           
Average 23 months 28 months  21 months 22 months 
Median 21 months 28 months  20 months 20 months 
            
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Figures 
Figure 1: Macroprudential policy
Sources: Zhang and Zoli (2014) and authors’ calculations.  
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Fig. 2: Systemic risk, credit cycle indicator, and macroprudential policy index 
 
 
 
Sources: Zhang and Zoli (2014), BIS, central banks of China, Korea and Thailand and authors’ calculations. 
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Fig 3. Deviations from the LT trend, indicator per GDP 
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations.  
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Figure 4.a. Macroprudential index versus NC liability-based ratios 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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Figure 4.b. Macroprudential index versus NC liability-based ratios (zoom 1) 
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Figure 4.c. Macroprudential index versus NC liability-based ratios (zoom 2) 
China
Korea
Thailand
Turkey
Malaysia
Serbia
Poland Romania
Russia
Slovakia
Estonia
Brazil
Bulgaria
Hungary
Mexico
Philippines
Saudi Arabia
Uruguay
Croatia
IndonesiaBangla esh
Bolivia
Colombia
Czech Republic
Egypt
Greece
Guatemala
Lithuania
Morocco
Nicaragua
Pakistan
Slovenia
Venezuela
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40% 45% 50%
N
C
. l
ia
b
 p
er
 G
D
P
NC ratio
MaPP>8 3<MaPP<8 MaPP<3 none
31 | P a g e  
 
Box 
Box 1: Composition of the economy’s non-core liabilities 
The composition of the economy’s non-core liabilities may also indicate a buildup of systemic risk 
as non-core liabilities are often in foreign currencies, cross-held by other intermediaries, and/or 
of shorter duration than retail deposits. 
In Fig Box a, components of financial companies’ liabilities are disaggregated by type of financial 
institution and liability category. Segments in blue/purple hues indicate liabilities of depository 
corporations (or monetary financial institutions for euro area economies), which include 
institutions traditionally thought of as banks—those that accept deposits. Liabilities of other 
financial corporations (OFCs) are displayed in orange/red. OFCs include but are not limited to 
insurance companies, funding corporations, and holding companies.  
Liabilities issued by OFCs can be considered borrowing to fund “shadow banking” activity. The 
figures below confirm that shadow banking has a more prominent role in developed economies 
such as Japan and the U.S. than in developing economies. This disparity is slightly more 
pronounced in the charts given that some emerging Asian central banks (South Korea, Malaysia) 
do not report balance sheet data for OFCs. Little data is available because their OFC sectors are 
not sufficiently developed to be measured. Indeed, Indonesia and Thailand have begun reporting 
OFC liabilities, but they represent less than 8 percent of total core and non-core liabilities. 
When viewed through the lens of non-core liabilities as a ratio of either core liabilities or the 
country’s gross domestic product, it is evident that emerging Asian economies are far less 
dependent on non-core liabilities to fund banking operations. The United States, by contrast, 
experienced remarkable growth in OFC liabilities in recent decades while depository institution 
liabilities remained somewhat level (below 25 percent).  
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Types of non-core liabilities 
Liabilities to non-residents 
While domestic retail deposits are considered part of banks’ core funding because of their 
stability, deposits from non-residents fall under non-core liabilities because they lack the same 
type of stability and can be subject to sudden withdrawals or reversals in the event of crisis. 
Foreign currency deposits cause a currency mismatch between the foreign currencies the bank 
borrows in and the domestic currency it lends to residents. Such currency mismatches—which 
were at the heart of the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s—increase systemic risk in the 
banking sector, especially in emerging markets. 
Loans 
This category is made up primarily of repurchase agreements, or “repos,” which are effectively 
collateralized loans. Repos are a popular form of short-term borrowing for financial institutions. 
Often, repurchase agreements last just one day and are subsequently “rolled over” in a cycle of 
very-short-term borrowing. Due to their short-term nature and being subject to haircuts or 
rollover risk during times of financial distress, repos can be considered a less stable source of 
funding than core deposits.  
Securities other than shares 
Securities other than shares are any kind of negotiable debt instrument, including bonds, 
commercial paper, and certificates of deposit. In developed economies, commercial paper has 
played a significant role in financial intermediaries’ ability to raise short-term debt. In early 2007 
the U.S. financial sector had $1.8 trillion in commercial paper outstanding, before falling by nearly 
20 percent as financial markets froze in the aftermath of the Lehman Brothers collapse. 
Vulnerability to such sudden, sharp funding reductions illustrate why these types of securities 
are considered “non-core” and their rapid buildup may indicate an accumulation of systemic risk. 
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                                Fig. Box a.: Non-core liabilities, categories 
   
 
 
 
             Sources: Bank of Korea, U.S. Federal Reserve and authors’ calculations. 
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
2001M12 2003M12 2005M12 2007M12 2009M12 2011M12
Korea, NC liabilities per GDP
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
2001M12 2003M12 2005M12 2007M12 2009M12 2011M12
NC liabilities per total liabilities
0.00
0.50
1.00
1.50
2.00
2000M01 2002M01 2004M01 2006M01 2008M01 2010M01 2012M01 2014M01
U.S., NC liabilities per GDP
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
2000M01 2002M01 2004M01 2006M01 2008M01 2010M01 2012M01 2014M01
NC liabilities per total liabilities
DC ltnr DC WS OFC WS core LT trend
34 | P a g e  
 
Fig. Box b.: Deviations from LT trend 
 
 
Source: Authors’calculations. 
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Appendix  
 
Policy Objective Level of Impact 
Monetary Price stability 
Macro: stable economic 
growth 
Macroprudential Stability of financial sector Both macro and micro 
Microprudential 
Stability of financial 
institutions 
Micro: protection of 
consumers 
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